Comparing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States

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**Introduction**

International best practice for engagement towards fragile and conflict-affected states has been based on the recognition that donor governments and international organizations need to plan and implement their assistance across the political, economic and security domains in a coherent and well-sequenced manner.\(^1\) This so-called whole of government approach seeks to address the interdependent challenges for development and security in contexts of state fragility in the most coordinated and efficient way.

In the last decade, Germany has developed and continually refined its own whole of government approach. Most recently, the government adopted “Interministerial guidelines for coherent Federal Government policy towards fragile states” that seek to provide a framework for policy coherence towards fragile states and situations.\(^2\) There are already several institutions to coordinate and support German efforts in crisis prevention and peacebuilding, including an Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention and an Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention with representatives from civil society and academia; several interministerial task forces concerned with specific countries and regions; the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), which provides training and education for peace operations; and a parliamentary Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Networked Security that has contributed to making the topic an important part of parliamentary discussions. While Germany has thus made great strides in advancing cross-government coherence towards fragile states, there is much debate on how to further improve institutional arrangements and implement a whole of government approach in practice.\(^3\)

This study seeks to provide an update on current practices and highlight innovative solutions to designing and implementing whole of government approaches towards fragile states that are relevant for the German debate. It is based on the research project “Comparing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States”, commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and conducted by the Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security (BIGS). The analysis examines current efforts to implement whole of government approaches towards fragile states in four donor countries: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada and Australia.\(^4\) These four case studies were chosen by the BMZ because of their innovative approaches from an initial pool of six countries that also included France and the United States during the first phase of research. The findings are based on an extensive literature review and interviews with government officials and experts in the selected countries. Interviews were conducted either in person or by phone between February and April 2013.

For each country, the authors analyse the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of the whole of government approach by discussing related strategies and frameworks, institutional arrangements and funding mechanisms as well as the role of development policy within the wider government approach. In a final section, the authors draw from the collective findings of all cases under consideration and propose recommendations for the further development of the German approach.
United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) has been widely recognized as a trailblazer in developing a whole of government approach (WGA) for issues of fragility and conflict. Experiences in civil-military engagements in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, among others, have strongly shaped the country’s integrated approach, while the UK’s practices with regard to security sector reform, aid effectiveness and other development areas are considered to be among the best in the world. As a reflection of the country’s strong commitment in fragile and conflict-affected states, the UK aims to raise the percentage of total national development aid spent in fragile states to 30% by 2014/2015 and is on target to allocate 0.7% of national income to development assistance by 2013 as the first G8 country to do so. In addition, recent developments like the adoption of a cross-government strategy for building stability abroad and reforms to its interdepartmental structures warrant a fresh look at the British whole of government approach.

(a) Strategies and frameworks

British attempts to create an integrated approach derive from experiences in West Africa and the Balkans in the late 1990s, which highlighted the need for greater interdepartmental cooperation between the Department of International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). While DFID has always seen conflict and fragility as a challenge to its central mission, poverty reduction, the MOD and the Foreign Office have traditionally regarded fragile states more as threats to regional stability and the security interests of the UK. DFID’s thinking about fragility and development and the need for a WGA has been articulated in various white papers since its creation 1997, starting with *Eliminating World Poverty: a challenge for the 21st Century*, which framed conflict as a serious impediment to development and already called for the deployment of „diplomatic, development assistance and military instruments in a coherent and consistent manner“.

Successive white papers increasingly integrated peacebuilding and statebuilding into DFID’s agenda, with the most recent one also pledging the development of joint government strategies for all fragile states that receive significant UK development assistance.

The experiences of UK civilian and military actors in Afghanistan and Iraq served as a catalyst to rethink and fundamentally improve the UK’s joined-up approach for interdepartmental policy planning and implementation in complex environments. However, doctrinal differences and frictions between development and military actors stalled initiatives to develop an official „comprehensive approach“ framework for several years. It was not until the Cameron administration took office in 2010 that a single government-wide strategy for addressing conflict and fragility was commissioned. Starting points were the updated National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) from October 2010, both of which see fragile states as pertinent challenges to national security and establish a whole of government approach incorporating diplomacy, defence and development efforts. The SDSR committed the UK government to increase overall official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of gross national income by 2013, raise the relative percentage of national aid spent on support for conflict-affected and fragile states to 30% by 2014/2015, and develop an integrated government strategy for conflict prevention and crisis reaction.
In July 2011, the FCO, DFID and the MOD jointly published the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), the country’s first cross-governmental strategy for addressing conflict and instability.10 Infused with the experience of the Arab Spring, the strategy represents a fundamental shift away from previous notions of state-centred stability towards a vision that seeks to support political systems that are “representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all.”11 BSOS lays out the rationale for UK engagement in fragile states – “where the risks are high, our interests are most at stake and where we know we can have an impact”12 – and defines UK efforts along three mutually reinforcing pillars of (1) early warning, (2) rapid crisis prevention and response and (3) an increased investment in upstream conflict prevention. The first pillar foresees the establishment of an Early Warning System that produces bi-annual Early Warning Reports assessing the risk of violent outbreaks in fragile states in the next twelve months, an annually updated internal Watchlist looking at the trajectory of priority countries on a five-year timescale, and an Annual Horizon Scan of emerging regional or thematic issues to inform long-term UK policy planning. The second pillar entails the creation of a £20 million Early Action Facility within the existing Conflict Pool to react to newly arising crises, e.g. through swift deployments of multi-functional Stabilisation Response Teams. The third pillar commits the government to develop joint conflict assessments and country plans, increase funding for conflict prevention and introduce multi-year programming for Conflict Pool projects. As a strategy, BSOS is clearly a step forward in creating the first cross-government strategy bringing together the UK’s diplomacy, development, and defence efforts under the single goal of conflict prevention and establishing an overarching framework for several already existing and newly created interdepartmental tools and structures.

In line with the third pillar of BSOS, the UK is now using joint conflict assessments and country strategies for fragile and conflict-affected states. The 2010 SDSR pledged the development of integrated strategies for all key countries and regions through an FCO-led process, with high priority countries chosen by the NSC. Examples of similar initiatives in the past were the drafting of a joint strategy for Yemen in 2005 and cross-governments assessments for Nepal and Somalia in 2009.13 At the ministerial level, such efforts have been supported by numerous joint trips the Secretaries of DFID, FCO and MOD have undertaken together to key countries like Sudan and Afghanistan in recent years. Joint country strategies will from now on benefit from the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework that was finalized in late 2012. By design, it “can be light touch or in-depth, depending on available timescales and customer needs, and is focused at the strategic level”14 to aid integrated planning, policy and resource decisions across the diplomatic, development and defence domains. The JACS tool, which was developed with input of non-governmental organisations specialized in peace-building,15 can also feed into cross-government or departmental early warning and programming processes and has already been implemented for several countries since 2012.

There are other interdepartmental strategies that BSOS interacts with, the most important one being the new International Defence Engagement Strategy published in February 2013.16 Jointly authored by the MOD and FCO in consultation with other departments like DFID, it defines the use of non-combat defence capabilities for advancing UK interests along four key areas, including support for conflict prevention and stabilisation efforts in line with BSOS. Although complementary in nature, the strategy also reflects the fact that defence interests were not fully incorporated into BSOS and it remains to be seen how well the two will be integrated in practice.

(b) Structures and instruments

At the strategic level, the National Security Council (NSC) created in 2010 serves as focal point for a prompt and coherent government crisis response and sets strategic priorities for the UK’s foreign and security policy. It is comprised of the ministers or state secretaries of key departments and meets on a weekly basis. A level below that the Building Stability Overseas Steering Group brings together the relevant Director Generals of DFID, FCO, MOD and other departments as needed.
It ensures overall efficiency of the integrated approach, reviews the early warning analysis to decide when new risks warrant ministerial attention and strategically considers UK efforts in Watchlist countries. Implementation of BSOS as a whole is assigned to the Building Stability Overseas Board (BSO Board), which reports to the three Secretaries of State and includes Directors from FCO, DFID, MOD and other interested departments like the Cabinet Office. The Board, created in early 2011, provides strategic direction to the interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit and Conflict Pool and is also in charge of determining the Pool’s resource plan and overseeing its reform process following recent evaluations.

In addition, there are several interdepartmental working groups that are not formally part of the BSOS framework but contribute input in a less formalized way nonetheless, e.g. the Integrated Approach Working Group.

One of the most notable interdepartmental institutions for dealing with fragile and conflict-affected states is the Stabilisation Unit (SU, formerly Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit), which was created following the UK experience in Afghanistan in 2004. Jointly owned by DFID, FCO and MOD, the SU is the British government’s centre of excellence for post-conflict stabilisation operations, formed to provide expert staff for stabilisation engagements at short notice and support interdepartmental analysis and planning. With a permanent staff of over 60 employees drawn from across Whitehall and a budget of about £10 million, the SU manages the UK’s Civilian Stabilisation Group, a roster of over 1,000 civilian specialists comprised of about 800 Deployable Civilian Experts from the non-government sector and a cadre of 200 Civil Service Stabilisation experts from various UK ministries that can be deployed at short notice to fragile countries and hostile environments. In 2011, the SU managed deployments of 377 people to 32 countries on bilateral and multilateral missions, including Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Haiti, and Kosovo.

Within the unit, there is a Capability Team responsible for managing the CSG and a Deployments Team that oversees deployments of civilian and police personnel to hostile environments (see Figure 1). The Security & Justice and Conflict & Stabilisation Teams provide expertise in their respective areas to help the UK government achieve a more integrated approach in conflict prevention and stabilisation. The SU’s Programme Support Team delivers tailored planning support to UK ministries and international partners through the development of integrated plans and provision of stabilisation expertise. Finally, a Lessons Team analyses and disseminates lessons learned that seek to guide policy planning and practical implementation on conflict and stabilisation.

The Unit can also provide parent departments with staff in times of need and has made notable contributions to the advancement of national and international doctrine on civil-military stabilisation operations through lessons learned and best practice advice. The SU can be tasked by UK departments to do scenario planning or facilitate cross-governmental strategies for fragile countries, two recent examples of which were the drafting of updated strategies for the Great Lakes region in eastern Africa and the Levante region around Syria. In addition, it was recently decided that the Unit will be the institutional memory of the JACS process, providing guidance and training on its implementation and supporting improvement with lessons learned. The process of commissioning a JACS and its outcomes, however, will still remain with the three parent departments.

Figure 1: Structure of the Stabilisation Unit

![Diagram of Stabilisation Unit Structure](source: Own diagram based on information from the Stabilisation Unit.)
An internal government review completed in March 2012 found that the SU showed “clear successes in the rapid deployment of experienced people to fragile environments”, a function that it should retain in conjunction with “an agile and focused role on planning, analysis and lessons which responds to the needs and prioritised tasking of parent departments.” The review sought to evaluate how the Unit’s mandate and structure needed to evolve in line with the new BSOS framework, and in the process raised a set of wider strategic questions about interdepartmental roles and leadership in stabilisation operations that are still subject to internal debate. In the words of one senior employee, the review was in that sense “as much about our parent departments as it was about us.” There was notable debate between the FCO, DFID and MOD about both the Unit’s current and future function. This included the degree to which the SU should be involved in conflict prevention and more long-term post-conflict activities; a clear division of competencies vis-à-vis thematically related units of its parent departments; its relationship to the Conflict Pool; and whether the Unit should be integrated into one of three departments, the Cabinet Office, or even be split up into an operational arm and a policy unit directly assigned to the NSC.

The report’s conclusions have led to several reforms that re-emphasize the operational focus and complementary nature of the Unit’s remit while improving its ability to formulate sound policy advice and capacity to engage in upstream conflict prevention in line with BSOS. The Unit’s new principal is a civil servant at Director level that now sits on the BSO Board and can attend senior-level meetings of the NSC(O) and its parent departments, thereby strengthening the Unit’s seniority and its exposure to upstream policy formulation. A new Management Board that brings together the deputy heads of the relevant departments of the FCO, DFID and MOD now supervises the reform process and operational work of the SU in monthly meetings, with the BSO Board retaining strategic oversight. A Conflict & Stabilisation Team was created within the Unit (see Figure 1) to build greater internal expertise on conflict-related issues; however, it is currently not clear how this new thematic capacity might be leveraged for the work of the Conflict Pool. Moreover, it was decided to relocate the SU from the DFID building to the Foreign Office as the FCO felt that it had the weakest relationship to the Unit among all three departments. Further reforms to “drive value for money and efficiency changes” are planned.

With regard to impact on cross-departmental integration, the argument can be made that the Stabilisation Unit could take up an even more pro-active role in fostering a joined-up approach to fragile states and situations. While the Unit has undoubtedly fostered cross-Whitehall understanding and coherence of stabilisation operations, many observers and former officials have asserted that the Unit has “often been constrained by the reluctance of its parent departments to give it responsibility.” Nevertheless, all interviewed officials praised the contributions of the Stabilisation Unit to UK whole of government efforts and expressed strong support for the Unit’s reform agenda. It remains to be seen how further efficiency reforms as well as the newly added task of conflict prevention will shape the SU’s role within the BSOS framework and its impact on joined-up policy planning and delivery.
(c) Funding mechanisms

One of the most innovative features of the UK’s approach to fragile states and situations is the Conflict Pool (CP), which is jointly administered by DFID, FCO and MOD. The Pool, in its current form, developed out of the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools that were created in 2001 to incentivize greater cooperation between the three ministries in conflict prevention and provide a mix of ODA and non-ODA funds for interdiscipinary activities like security sector reform. Both pools were merged in 2008 and subsumed the Stabilisation Aid Fund in 2009, which was created to support stabilisation activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Funding is derived from an individual budget line that is independent of ministerial budgets, thus giving the departments extra funds for joint activities. Current Conflict Pool resources amount to approximately £225 million for five regional programmes and one thematic area in addition to funds for the Stabilisation Unit and the new Early Action Facility (see Table 1), with slightly more ODA than non-ODA resources at present. Its annual budget is scheduled to reach £309 million by 2014/2015.

Table 1: Indicative Conflict Pool allocations for 2012-13 (in £million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional programmes</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider Europe</td>
<td>36.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic programmes</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation Unit</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Action Facility</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total programme funds               | 225.6 |

The decision-making process is tri-departmental at all levels (see Figure 2). Projects are determined jointly through a competitive bidding process in which interdepartmental project boards at country or headquarters level receive project bids from regional or country teams from any of the three ministries. Accepted projects are then managed and delivered by the respective department according to its own rules and specifications, with varying levels of delegation, often down to embassy level.

Each programme receives strategic management supervision by a senior tripartite Programme Board comprised of a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), e.g. the relevant Regional Director from FCO or DFID, and his counterparts from the other ministries. The Programme Board has overall expenditure authority, with the SRO being formally accountable for project results delivery. A designated Programme Manager holds administrative responsibility for each portfolio.
At the working level, project teams receive support and guidance from a five-member tri-departmental Conflict Pool Secretariat that monitors the Pool’s finances and supports the BSO Board on all Pool-related issues.

With regard to its usefulness in fostering an integrated approach in conflict prevention, two recent evaluations from 2012 by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) provide a rather critical view of its performance. Both studies lament the cumbersome management structure and decision-making process; a lack of an effective performance measurement system; and weak accountability relationships. The ICAI study additionally emphasized the lack of a strategic framework and the Pool’s overall failure to achieve strategic impact. However, there were also positive appraisals in that the Conflict Pool was viewed as a “useful and important mechanism” (ICAI) and its “good practice (...) in working collaboratively should be shared with the rest of Whitehall” (NAO), highlighting the need for a greater results focus and streamlined governance structure.

Although officials interviewed for this study acknowledged that working through the Conflict Pool entails significant transaction costs, all unanimously agreed that it is a valuable instrument to foster coherence of UK conflict prevention efforts abroad. There was a general sense that it has greatly encouraged shared analysis and planning as well as interdepartmental relationship-building and awareness both at headquarters and country level. Its funding model based on a mix of ODA and non-ODA resources was commonly commended for its flexibility and responsiveness to fund a wide variety of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; it ideally also serves as a ‘catalyst’ to attract larger donors to promising small-scale projects, a key strength of the Pool also mentioned in the ICAI review.

While disagreement, competition and a certain degree of implicit logrolling between the three departments do play a role, incentives for cooperation are strong. The fact that the Conflict Pool now operates under a cross-government strategy that is jointly owned by all three Secretaries of State and publicly backed by the Prime Minister provides some institutional pressure to overcome differences at the working level. At departmental level, the Pool offers welcome additional funds for conflict prevention activities for the FCO and especially the MOD, which has essentially no resources for such activities outside the Conflict Pool. DFID, whose bilateral programmes in fragile states often dwarf those of the Pool’s, has a notable benefit in that it can feed into the joint planning process at all times and ensure that development concerns are adequately addressed.
The upside of the lengthy and at times frustrating interdepartmental decision-making process is that it not only guarantees ownership by all sides but also provides a constructive challenge to project design, with all three departments contributing their capacity and expertise in the process.

Officials recognized the need to further streamline the Pool’s governance structure as well as strengthen accountability relationships and performance measurement arrangements. However, the latter is also a product of differing departmental standards for project management and monitoring that are not easy to reconcile. Following the evaluations in 2012, the Conflict Pool is still in a process of reform and several measures are currently being implemented, including a Conflict Pool Strategy that prescribes a more effective resource allocation and puts greater emphasis on upstream conflict prevention, conflict-sensitive programming and improved monitoring arrangements.

As the civil war in Libya began to unfold in February/March 2011, a National Security Council subcommittee for Libya, NSC (L), was established to coordinate and drive UK decision-making at Cabinet level. Ministerial responsibility for stabilisation and post-conflict planning was delegated to DFID. Interdepartmental coordination was facilitated through a subcommittee at official level (later named the Post Conflict Coordination Cell). The Stabilisation Unit was tasked by the MOD and the Cabinet Office on February 24 to facilitate early scenario planning; it additionally provided written guidance to senior officials and the NSC on early stabilisation priorities. In May 2011, the Unit then served as operational platform for the deployment of an International Stabilisation Response Team (IRST) comprised of UK and international experts to assess immediate stabilisation challenges on the ground and help the international community define its support priorities during the transition phase. Within just over two weeks, the SU was able to prepare and deploy the IRST to Benghazi, including accommodation, support and protection. In addition, £20.5 million were allocated from the Conflict Pool to support post-conflict activities in Libya for 2011/12. This included initial funding for communications equipment, body armour, financial and staff support and technical advice on security sector and public finance management. 28

In the case of Mali, a JACS was undertaken in autumn 2012 and provided the UK government with a better understanding of local conditions when the French intervention commenced in January 2013. In close coordination with FCO and DFID, the Stabilisation Unit provided conceptual input into cross-Whitehall strategy formulation and is currently reviewing future options of UK stabilisation support to multilateral missions by the EU and the UN. Two civilian experts were also deployed on short-term trips to support early UN planning on the ground. Furthermore, the Early Action Facility within the Conflict Pool has been tapped to finance UK support of French air movements and provide £5 million for two new UN funds in support of international efforts in Mali, £3 million of which were pledged for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali and £2 million to “activity in Mali that would facilitate and support political processes for building stability.” 29
(d) Role of development policy within the UK’s whole of government approach

It is fair to say that development concerns are well integrated into the UK’s whole of government approach to fragile states on both strategic and operational levels. As a cabinet-level ministry, DFID is on equal footing with other departments and its Secretary is a permanent member of the National Security Council and other relevant sub-committees, ensuring that development concerns are heard in ministerial discussions about long-term policies and short-term crisis response.

“DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS ARE WELL INTEGRATED INTO THE UK’S APPROACH”

The UK’s commitment to allocate 30% of development assistance to fragile states by 2014/15 within an expanding aid budget that is scheduled to reach 0.8% of national income strongly reflects the current political will to increase British engagement with issues of fragility and conflict. DFID has also reorganized itself internally along with these priorities: The previous Fragile States Team housed in the Policy Division was recently merged with the Conflict Policy Team to form the Fragile States and Conflict Group that is now situated in the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department of DFID to more effectively integrate issues of conflict, fragility, peacebuilding and statebuilding in the department’s programming. The progressive concept of stability adopted by BSOS also sits well with DFID’s understanding of legitimacy, non-violent conflict resolution and the quality of political institutions from a development viewpoint.

Within the UK whole of government approach, DFID is furthermore a key stakeholder of the Conflict Pool and the Stabilisation Unit. In the Conflict Pool, DFID has been increasingly less engaged in a spending role. As conflict-related expenditure within DFID’s bilateral programmes has notably grown in recent years, there has been much less of an incentive to access relatively small funds for conflict prevention through the Conflict Pool. This weakness in the Conflict Pool’s current set-up was also highlighted in the ICAI review. Participation in the Pool’s decision-making process, however, allows DFID to feed into the inter-departmental planning process, ensure that activities fit with the wider development agenda in a given country and oversee the correct accounting of ODA expenses. It also provides a large share of conflict-related expertise and support on issues like monitoring and evaluation. According to one government official, “DFID does not need the Conflict Pool but the Pool needs DFID for its thematic and geographic expertise.” At the same time, there is an understanding within the department of the need to be more engaged with the Conflict Pool and some ideas are currently under consideration on how to make the Pool more accessible and responsive for small-scale projects than existing departmental programming. DFID has also been a strong advocate of further improving the Pool’s accountability framework and strengthening its long-term programming focus.
With respect to the Stabilisation Unit, DFID has had perhaps the closest relationship with the unit out of all three parent departments. This is reflected by the fact that the Department has not only physically housed the SU but its last three directors were also recruited from DFID’s ranks. As regards potential overlaps between the Unit’s work and the development portfolio, DFID has often tapped into the Unit’s expertise in security and justice sector reform and generally welcomes its growing capacity for upstream conflict prevention. Thus, while both bodies might retain a similar skill set in certain areas, there is a “natural complementarity” according to one senior DFID official in that the SU focuses on lessons learned and prioritises tri-departmental requests and those of the NSC, whereas related units within DFID provide support to DFID programming, respond to country office requests and, above all, remain in charge of policymaking.

Looking ahead, it remains to be seen how interdepartmental cooperation will play out in a context of austerity and budget cuts that spare DFID and the foreign aid budget. With its growing engagement in fragile states, DFID will be challenged to demonstrate ‘value for money’ in highly complex and fluid environments that often defy traditional models of development cooperation and results measurement. Finally, even as BSOS can be commended for its progressive vision of people-centred stability and upstream conflict prevention, it is not clear how easily security-driven priorities to build stability in high risk countries – not all of which might be low-income fragile states – will be integrated with DFID’s agenda of poverty reduction and sustainable development.

(e) Conclusions

A decade after the creation of the first pooled funds for conflict prevention, the integration of British development, diplomacy and defence efforts in practice is still very much ‘work in progress.’ Nevertheless, the UK has developed by far the most advanced whole of government approach to fragile states of all donor governments under consideration here, and its multifaceted experience provides a rich background for discussion of best practices.

First of all, government officials overwhelmingly agree that working through interdepartmental institutions like the Conflict Pool and the Stabilisation Unit, in spite of their noted shortcomings, have greatly advanced joint planning, mutual understanding and relationship-building between DFID, FCO and MOD over the past years. The new formalized processes for interdepartmental early warning and conflict analysis were also generally commended as strongly advantageous to previous departmentalized approaches.

Secondly, the critical evaluations of the Conflict Pool have shown that jointly administered funds, while creating unique financial incentives for interagency cooperation, require strategic direction and a clear mandate outlining how they can create an additional benefit to existing ministerial portfolios and advance truly interdisciplinary projects.

Thirdly, the Stabilisation Unit provides a well-functioning model of an interdepartmentally administered unit that acts as an internal service provider and facilitator for interagency planning. Its planning support has proven particularly valuable in crisis and stabilisation situations, while its lessons learned and thematic capabilities are useful complements to departmental portfolios.

Finally, as an alternative to standing interdepartmental bodies like the Stabilisation Unit, joint strategies and cross-government conflict assessments for key countries appear to be a worthwhile approach to foster integrated planning and priority setting across government while requiring less transaction costs than pooled funds and the creation of new structures that need to be scraped out of existing units or set up entirely from scratch.
Denmark

With more than 0.7% of Denmark’s gross national income spent on foreign-aid and assistance through the UN for more than 30 years, Denmark is generally viewed as a leading donor in terms of innovation and best practices. The country has also had a great deal of experience in stabilisation efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, which helped to forge the Danish civil-military approach in complex post-conflict environments. The country is credited for having played an important role in advancing the concept of a “comprehensive approach” within NATO and whole of government approaches to development challenges in fragile states in the development discourse. After the change of government in Denmark following the 2011 elections, the program for fragile states has been pursued and the new government increased its funding. Long-term commitments for development aid were sustained but more emphasis has been put on fragile and weak states. Recent changes in improving its own whole of government approach for dealing with fragility and conflict, e.g. the formulation of a new fragile states strategy and the creation of new interdepartmental structures, make Denmark a very worthwhile case for analysis in this study.

The Danish Finance and Appropriations Act of 2011 upgraded the new policy towards fragile states and eight countries were identified as new Danish partners. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Burma received about $284.6 million U.S. in bilateral assistance in 2011. Among other things these funds were to be used to “promote peace, freedom and democracy and alleviate humanitarian needs.”

(a) Strategies and frameworks

After the Iraq invasion in 2003, the Danish government realized that with the war’s complexity, a more comprehensive approach was needed. The Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) 2004-2009 strategy was then authored and put in place jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD). The CPA focused on “peace support operations” instead of territorial defence. In the scope of this new cooperation agreement between the MoD and MFA, the Danish Government also pressed for the development of the CPA concept in the context of NATO and other international organizations, where the concept of a “Comprehensive Approach” would take over from 2006 onwards. However, since its participation in the Afghanistan mission, it became apparent that the Danish strategy on CPA needed some modernization. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark published a new policy paper called Strategy for Danish Development Policy in 2010 as its “modernized” approach. Based on the chapter on stability and fragility from its 2010 strategy, the Danish government additionally released a whole publication entitled Peace and Stabilisation: Denmark’s Policy Towards Fragile State 2010-2015. As pointed out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs this policy paper is “[t]he starting point […] that aims to establish priority areas both for our own bilateral engagement and for our contribution to strengthening the international community’s joint efforts in this critical area.”

Following the Minister’s commitment, the Ministry published in June 2012 a more specific policy paper to refine its policy for development cooperation aid and its strategies towards fragile states, entitled: The Right to a Better Life: Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation.

Amid the removal of the rubble and the debris in Port-au-Prince, some residents have been able to resume their normal lives.

© ACDI-CIDA / Jean-François Leblanc
This broad policy paper is very ambitious and describes strategies for Danish foreign engagement. Out of this policy paper, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Development Cooperation released a Road Map for Implementation of the Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation in 2012 focused on stability and fragility, explaining Danish government’s priorities and the actions to achieve its goals. This sort of “guide” of implementation for Danish strategies and actions in fragile states contains a set of indicators and a dedicated funding framework. According to the Road Map, Denmark would increase in 2012 its support for fragile states intervention, to 1 billion DKK, for stabilisation, reconstruction and capacity building efforts. Denmark’s strategies and commitment into fragile states are determined under 5 priority areas, including support for rule of law and security sector reforms and the need for access to basic needs such as drinking water, among others. According to the Peace and Stabilisation strategy, Denmark is committed to focusing on stabilisation and security efforts, the “promotion of improved livelihoods and economic opportunities, democratisation, good governance and human rights, conflict prevention and regional conflict management.”

(b) Structures and instruments

Created in 2012 under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Centre for Global Politics and Security, follows a clear mandate of “streamlining and strengthening Denmark’s efforts in fragile states. The Centre represents all relevant regional departments (Asia and Latin America, Middle East and North of Africa, and Africa) including the Department for Stabilisation and Security Policy. In order to foster the cooperation and integration of the operational level and the policy departments, this joint “Centre” with the two departments for stabilisation and regional policy was established in the same office complex. Together they promote and ensure better synergy of Danish policies and efforts towards fragile states (horizontal cooperation). They are responsible for the coordination of Danish multilateral engagements towards fragile states for “military, security and civilian contribution in international peace missions under the UN, NATO, EU/CSDP,” the prevention of terrorism, non-proliferation and disarmament programs. In addition, they also support the Minister for Development in his duty as co-chair of the International Dialogue and organize the Civilian Peace and Stabilisation Response, which is the Danish roster of civilian experts ready to be deployed in fragile states. The Centre is staffed with public servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Ministry of Defence and development experts. Even if they are located in the same building, they stay on the payroll of their respective ministry.

Integrated into the Department for Stabilisation and Security Policy, the Whole-of-Government Stabilisation Secretariat helps the Whole-of-Government Board (WGB) in its task of coordinating the Danish comprehensive approach and aligning all departments and activities towards fragile states on the same objectives and goals. The Secretariat regroups staffers from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development and Defence into a cohesive unit. The Whole-of-Government Board is chaired alternately by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence from the Under-Secretary of State’s level.
Box 2: Department for Stabilisation and Security’s priorities and foreign aid assistance

Denmark’s international involvements in fragile states take mostly place within the framework of a multilateral organisation such as NATO, UN, AU or EU. Embassies play key coordination roles within the Danish WGA on the field level. Either under the umbrella of multinational organisations or at the local level, the Danish government’s priorities mostly include the promotion of justice and security sector reforms, support to statebuilding and democracy, legitimate governance and local ownership. In addition, in order to help local authorities to deliver basic needs to their citizens, such as drinking water, food, health and employment to preserve legitimacy of state, the Danish government will “support interventions, which promote employment and provides alternatives to violence and conflict and which ensure that social services are delivered.”

Following Denmark’s experience in Afghanistan, the government has put in place a new structure for efforts to deal with fragility and crises, which is organized under four levels. Firstly, at the top level, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, State and others meet annually and set the agenda for foreign missions.

Secondly, at the next level, the WGB determines programs and structure of fund distribution. The Board meets on a monthly basis and is composed of high level representatives from a broader range of Ministries such as the Prime Minister’s Office, Justice, Development, Foreign Affairs and Defence Command. The WGB ensure a flexible coordination of the Danish strategies for engagements in fragile states. Furthermore, the WGB is responsible for the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund.
Thirdly, to support the Whole-of-Government Board, a Whole-of-Government Secretariat was formed to help the administration of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund. In addition, the Secretariat analyses the lessons learned from engagements and stabilisation efforts in fragile states, provides strategic guidance, and support policy development. The Secretariat also coordinates with related thematic and geographic departmental units for their activities in fragile states. The Secretariat also facilitates the recruitment of new civilian advisors, fact-finding missions and processes of reporting, evaluation and learning.41

Finally, a fourth level of the structure (not part of Figure 4) is a wider group of representatives, comprising NGOs, private companies, relevant governmental entities and the judiciary. They meet to discuss their experiences and involvement in working in conflicted areas and fragile situations.42

Figure 4:
Structure of the Danish whole of government approach towards fragile states

For the coordination between Copenhagen and the tactical level where troops are deployed, for instance in Afghanistan, separate communication processes of command have been organized between the military and civilians entities. A high-level experienced representative of the Danish MFA coordinates the efforts between the national civil/military departments and relates with Copenhagen. This pivotal point of contact between the various entities is crucial for the functioning of the Danish WGA in fragile context.

The Danish government is committed to building a strategic framework for each fragile state where it will engage in missions and foreign aid, similar to how it has handled the WGA in the case of Afghanistan. Denmark’s newly founded structure aims at reinforcing its “abilities to help stabilise, reconstruct and build capacity for areas of conflict.”43

Box 3: Danish roster of civilian experts – Civilian Peace and Stabilisation Response

Denmark is currently reforming and improving its civilian roster in accordance with a need for a broader range of expertise and shorter notice requirements since it increased its engagement towards fragile states. The reform also includes “a more strategic use of the Civilian Peace and Stabilisation Response which consists of 450 deployable civilian experts for multilateral stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, the Sahel and South Sudan.”44 Denmark also seeks to recruit more civilians who have new specialized expertise for capacity-building abroad, and supports them through trainings, incentive structures and protection measures.

The Whole-of-Government Secretariat is responsible for the overall coordination of this roster of civilian experts (e.g. recruitment, training and deployment), but the administration work was subcontracted in early February 2013 to a private company. It was an open source procurement process advertised on the Danish Government’s website.45

(c) Funding mechanisms

Denmark’s efforts in fragile states are supported by a special budget mechanism. The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund administers $163 million U.S. as of January 2013 in two funds: the Development Assistance Fund and the Security Fund. The Security Fund is a non-development assistance fund and provides more flexibility for programming as it is not subject to OECD criteria. Both funds are dedicated to enhancing efforts for security, peace-building and development through an integrated approach to stabilisation in fragile states.46 Figure 5 below shows the different budget areas which operate under the fund. The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is disbursed in a three-to-five year disbursement plan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the government’s main budget.

Figure 5: Structure of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund

| Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund ($163 million U.S. or 930 million DKK) in 2013 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Development Assistance Fund | Non-Development Assistance Fund |
| (for the Danish Official Development Assistance in fragile states) | (for the international security cooperation/global stabilisation efforts in fragile states) |
| Regional Programmes: | |
| • Horn of Africa: $38 million U.S. | |
| • Afghanistan / Pakistan: $32 million U.S. | |
| • Europe: $12 million U.S. | |
| Crisis Response | |
| $31 million U.S. – e.g. Libya, South Sudan, Sahel | |
| Unallocated Fund | |
| $23 million U.S. for crises response of high political priority | |

(d) Role of development policy within Denmark’s whole of government approach

The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), created in 1962 as part of the MFA, has the mandate of giving advice and recommendations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs through its board on development issues as well as on DANIDA’s strategies, policies and programmes. DANIDA is also headed by its own Minister, the Minister for Development Cooperation. However, DANIDA is considered to be a brand and the employees are in fact all working for the Foreign Ministry. According to their task and mandate, they will acknowledge working either for DANIDA or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact they all work within the same Ministry which has a department entitled DANIDA that is responsible for the Danish foreign aid assistance and cooperation development.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is leading the WGA within the Danish government and all relevant structures are formally organized under the MFA. The two other most relevant Ministries (Defence and Development Cooperation) are fully cooperating and integrated into the whole structure. The Ministry of Development and Cooperation provides guidelines and strategies for state-building efforts once there is some kind of political stabilisation in the country of intervention and once secure humanitarian aid strategies have been established. DANIDA is responsible for most of Denmark’s ODA disbursement and the coordination and programmes are coordinated at the embassy level.

Since many years now, DANIDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a whole, pay special attention to communication strategies. They understand that the support of the parliamentarians is vital for their budget allowance and accountability of missions, but perhaps what is more important is the support of the Danes to secure their budget, their policy and their missions. The training of the departments’ employees to speak with the press, the multiple publications and the transparency of the evaluation programs and their publications, help the establishment of a favourable understanding of missions abroad and help in securing and justifying budgets. All evaluation reports are published on DANIDA’s website.

Box 4: Cooperation opportunities with Denmark

Stabilising fragile states is a priority for the Danish government which is committed to collaborate with like-minded countries in stabilisation efforts and to ensure protection to vulnerable communities. Programs enhancing conflict prevention, stabilisation and reconstruction are actively encouraged through regional and multilateral organization.\textsuperscript{47} As stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark is committed to promote a comprehensive approach for donor countries through the European Union and other international organizations. In 2012, the Danish Minister committed the country to use its EU presidency to promote the ”EU’s Whole of System Approach to humanitarian, development, political and security activities.”\textsuperscript{48}

(e) Conclusions

The new inter-departmental government structure for efforts in fragile and weak states has been fully implemented only since 2012, so it is still too early to say whether it works and what kind of problems may arise, but it is certainly a good step forward for Denmark’s WGA. According to government representatives, the current Danish structure with high ranking leadership and funding mechanism that provides more flexibility was inspired by the Canadian approach and it appears that this type of organisation of WGA may become a model for other donor countries involved in high risk missions, from which they can adapt according to their own government realities.

As described in the OECD DAC Peer Review 2011, DANIDA and the Minister of Co-operation Development receive “popular support and understanding in parliament, civil society and among opinion leaders.”\textsuperscript{49} Since the perception of the DANIDA and the Foreign Ministry’s role are well communicated among different actors of the country, it is much easier to act and push the political representatives and the population to support and endorse new complex missions, such as the ones in fragile states where the risks and difficulties are very high, whereas in other circumstances, those missions could actually put them (the politicians) in more difficult situations and maybe destabilize their support for re-election.
Canada

Since the 9/11 attack against the United States, Canada adapted its 3D (Defence, Development, Diplomacy) approach that had been implemented since the late 1990’s. As a result, Defence has a broader importance within the Canadian government. Canada changed drastically from a foreign policy based on "soft power and focused on human security through ‘light’ UN peacekeeping missions"50 to heavier missions, such as Afghanistan and Libya and an updated combat ready military with brand new equipment. For example, the Department of National Defence (DND)’s budget increased “from around C$11 billion in 2001-2002 to about C$21 billion by 2010-2011.”51 While committing to a greater role for the military, justified by national security reasons,52 Canada will continue to support poorer and unstable foreign countries.

In 2005-2006, Canada increased its development aid and assistance for fragile states and focused on a list of “priority countries”. Within that list, Afghanistan, Haiti, West Bank of Gaza, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have always been on top of Canada’s priority list and focus. At the moment, Canada has people on the ground in each of these countries, either as humanitarian experts from Canada’s International Cooperation and Development Agency (CIDA), police officers, military under a multilateral mission, or as representatives of NGOs funded by the Canadian Government. Canada’s priorities in these states are the promotion of democracy, rule of law, ownership, gender equality, health and access to basic needs such as water. Many programs are funded under CIDA, the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and other government departments to advance those priorities and values.

Canada is the eighth largest DAC member in terms of aid program donation and its net ODA contribution amounting to $5.29 billion U.S. in 2011 represents a ratio of 0.31% of its national income.53 Canada is far from reaching the 0.7% UN spending target of gross national income, which the country has not endorsed.54

(a) Strategies and frameworks

After an exhaustive foreign policy and humanitarian aid review, the Government of Canada published a policy paper, International Policy Statement (IPS), in April 2005 under the former Liberal Government of Paul Martin. The IPS was an ambitious project that covered all relevant departments involved in foreign assistance in harmonizing the roles of the Ministries of DFAIT, DND and CIDA. Furthermore, the IPS established priorities and parameters to respond to twenty-first century’s requirements in dealing with complex missions and in addition established a new funding mechanism.55 However, after the 2006 national election and a change of government, the IPS was not pursued. But, even if the IPS was abandoned, some elements like the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) team remained and other components were pursued either under different names or were adapted according to the new Government’s priorities.

In 2005, Canada created START to align government departments in a whole of government approach for efforts in fragile states. START became the pillar of Canada’s WGA towards fragile states and is responsible for the coordination of policy and operations for the country’s involvement in weak states through bilateral interventions or multilateral missions. START team operates under DFAIT and reports to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Its mission is in line with DFAIT priorities for effective “global governance and international security and stability.”56 It is the first operation group Canada sends to missions in fragile states with goals of reducing violence, protecting civilians and key security sectors and facilitating political dialogue.

Since 2006, each Ambassador must annually produce a Country Strategy highlighting how the embassy will orchestrate its activities to advance Canada’s interests in the country.
Using and engaging all relevant departments or agencies of the Canadian Government, the Ambassador outlines a WGA framework for linking its. This report is also referenced in the ambassador’s Performance Management Agreement. In 2007, guidance for CIDA’s engagement in fragile states was finally approved. The *Internal Guide for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States* was adapted from the 2005 IPS policy proposal by the new Canadian government. It intended to align all departments involved on a common goal, through clear mandates for each relevant department. Concerned about effectiveness, the Canadian government in addition published through CIDA an *Action Plan for 2009-2012 for New Aid Effectiveness*. CIDA also published a document entitled *Canada making a difference in the world: A policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness* that promotes the comprehensive approach but also elaborates on CIDA’s engagement in fragile states. It states clear goals to be reached in the context of enhancing the effectiveness of Canada’s aid. This document was mainly addressed to CIDA’s departments and programs and explained how the institution could improve its efficiency internally and in the field. This document is aligned with the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation promoting more accountability and aid effectiveness, which Canada supported through CIDA in 2011. CIDA’s program activities are divided under five main departments and one of them is exclusively dedicated to Fragile States and Crisis-Affected Communities.

Furthermore, DFAIT has regional policy desks that coordinate with diplomatic missions, ambassadors and high commissioners. These regional desks work closely with CIDA and have strong expertise and a broad range of contacts with people on the ground in the countries for which they are responsible. They are key elements of all strategies and development for their respective countries. They are also responsible for diplomatic delegations and travel briefings of Ministers. When START is monitoring countries that are at risk of emerging conflicts, the Desks are always involved in the WGA process and the sharing of information is crucial. In addition, DND also has its own analysts of conflict prevention and a whole research department on foreign affairs and policies which also collaborate with academics and think tanks. There are on-going discussions on weak and unstable foreign states between the DND foreign affairs’ department, DFAIT as well as CIDA’s policy branch. There are daily discussions within the START directorate about on-going peacekeeping missions and DND. Situations develop at a fast pace and discussions on an international level happen on a regular basis. Therefore, monitoring of the activities at the United Nations in New York is necessary and information needs to be shared between the Ministries in order to avoid “surprises” and be ready when Canada is needed. On that front there are no specific policies or guidelines in place. There is a statement of understanding and cooperation between the directorates.

**“CANADA HAS A SPECIAL TASK FORCE WITH AN INDEPENDENT BUDGET FOR DEALING WITH FRAGILE STATES.”**

**(b) Structures and instruments**

The three main actors of the WGA towards fragile states are the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs. These three are headed by their own Ministers and represent pillars in foreign missions and Canada’s involvement abroad. One of the strengths of the Canadian WGA is that it goes well beyond the 3Ds and includes all relevant government departments. (See Figure 6) Tension among departments with different tasks is normal and cannot be avoided. However, when it comes to advising the cabinet, consistency is a priority. This ultimately results in departments acting together to resolve issues that arise. To reach that level of understanding and “maturity” in cooperation between public servants, it takes a while. It takes time to put in place new structures/departments within the government and within the mindset of bureaucrats. According to an interviewed official, putting in place an efficient WGA took at least 2 to 3 years and “the job is never completely done”. So if such a process in policy shifting is engaged it should be sustained and encouraged even if elections take places and governments changes.
Figure 6: Institutions involved in the WGA for fragile states according to their respective fields of expertise

START (DFAIT)
- Supports stabilization efforts through the GPSF;
- Deploys its own civilian experts;
- Coord. deployment of other departments, including police

CIDA
- Addresses development issues by improving the effectiveness of public institutions and society as well as key services

DN Defence
- Provision of safe and secure environment;
- Capacity building of host nation forces, support SSR and peace-support, counter insurgency and major combat operations

Justice
- Focus on justice sector reforms by improving laws and strengthening law-related institutions
- Funded by CIDA and DFAIT, under the Int. Stab. Act

RCMP
- Police expertise, training and advice to police service in states that require assistance;
- Mun., prov. and reg. police force and RCMP

Can. Border Serv. Agency
- Supports stabilization efforts by strengthening border management through training and monitoring host nation’s border officials
- Funded by DFAIT

Correctional Services Canada
- Helps host nation to conform to international human rights standard
- Advice on infra-structure, policy, training and mentoring;
- Funded by DFAIT

Public Safety
- Provides advice to the Gov. of Canada on the development of security system capacity building about threats to Canada

START = COORDINATOR - with all relevant actors according to the situation and the needs

Source: Own diagram based on information from Canadian whole of government documents.

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), based within DFAIT, is the coordinator for Canada’s WGA for all operations and deployments to fragile states. They are responsible for bringing relevant departments of the Canadian Government together and together they set the rules of mission when crises such as natural disaster and armed conflicts arise.

Even if START is the coordination pillar, it doesn’t act alone as Figure 6 shows. It took many years to reach that level of coherence and involvement from the various actors. Canada first embraced the concept of the 3D approach in the 1990s and since the events of 9/11 the concept has taken more importance. Therefore, in 2005 the Government of Canada decided to put in place a special “Unit” the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, in order to coordinate with all the participants under a whole of government approach in fragile states and to improve coherence and efficiency within the Canadian government. The creation of START was in response to the recognition that “ad hoc and uncoordinated policy, program and operational responses to complex international crises are insufficient and unsustainable.” Therefore, START and the Global Peace and Stabilization Fund (GPSF) ought to fill a “policy, institutional and funding gap between CIDA humanitarian and long-term development assistance and National Defence and the Canadian Forces (DND) military and training assistance.”

The leader responsible for fostering the new concept of Canadian’s WGA towards fragile states was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2008, the Ministry initiated its first evaluation and review. According to its recommendations, START made some modifications and the Re-START was born. The new structure now has four divisions that are headed by a Deputy Director. The “Peace Operations and Fragile States Policy Division” is responsible for all policy related to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention; the second division entitled “Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Division” looks at complex emergencies and natural disasters; thirdly, the divisions for “Deployment and Coordination” and “Stabilization and Reconstruction”.

61
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Reconstruction Programs are responsible for the program allocations in one thematic area and three geographic regions (Africa and Middle East, Asia and Latin America). For approval with regards to Programming and Departmental Security START now reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister and policy directions are overseen by the Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Director within the Department of Foreign Affairs. Below is the structure of the START bureau which has a staff of 80 people (see Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Structure of START after 2008**

The International Peace Operation Branch, located at the RCMP headquarters in Ottawa includes both police and civilian personal. They are responsible for the recruitment and the training of police officers for such missions. The recruitment is made from a basket/pool of municipal, provincial, regional and the federal police corps (RCMP). The role of the police officers sent abroad varies from training police, providing humanitarian assistance, security for elections and investigation of human rights violation. Since 1989, more than 3000 Canadian police officers have served on more than 60 peace operation missions around the world. However, it is only since 1995 that municipal, provincial and regional police are included and participate in the agreement. Today, Canada has police missions for instance in Afghanistan, Sudan, Timor, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Kosovo and few others either under multilateral or bilateral operations.

**Box 5: Rule of law and police programs**

START has an agreement for a program with the civil police, the Canadian Police Agreement, which was concluded between DFAIT, CIDA, Public Safety and in consultation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The program is headed by a committee with representatives of three departments (CIDA, DFAIT and RCMP) and analyses the deployment proposals and requests. Requests can come from any bilateral or multilateral partner, regional desks, ambassadors, etc., and have to conform to the guidelines and requirements as stated on the RCMP website. The Committee submits recommendations to START and if there is agreement on the recommendations, approvals are requested and needed from the three Ministers before sending police officers abroad. The funds for that program come from CIDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
When talking about “heavier” international missions that are either bilateral or under a multilateral organisation, such as Libya, Afghanistan and Haiti, the structure starts at the very top level of operation with the Prime Minister of Canada seconded by his Ministers’ of Foreign Affairs and National Defence who have the decisional power and can interfere at any stage of a mission and/or at any departmental level. (see Figure 8)

Box 6: A different approach for the Afghanistan mission

In the case of the Afghanistan mission, Canada’s biggest commitment of its kind, its structure was quite different. A Ministerial Cabinet Committee of five Ministers with a mandate to monitor the mission and ensure the PM would receive all relevant information in regards to the mission. A sub-committee was also established with representatives of all relevant departments and reported to the Cabinet Afghanistan’s committee.

It included 25 representatives from relevant government departments. The sub-committee also had the obligation to report and update the Prime Minister (regularly) and the Parliament (four times per year) on the mission. The sub-committee was responsible for the WGA within the Canadian Government and was headed by the Director General of START.

Earthquake in Haiti - This Haitian family received one of 3,511 cooking and water storage kits speedily sent by Canada.

Under a memorandum format, START prepares recommendations for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence and is given to the Ministers through the START Board. The two Ministers are members of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Committee, which is officially called the “Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee”. It comprises eleven Ministers that are selected by the Prime Minister and is mandated to advise the PM on important issues related to government priorities and ratifies recommendations, from sub-cabinet committees such as the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Following a decision, the Privy Council Office and the Ministers involved give directions to their departments (vertical messaging). For fragile state missions, START then takes the lead for the whole of government approach (horizontal messaging). START’s Advisory Board, in consultation with the general directors of relevant cross departmental ministries and agencies, puts in place rules of mission and funds are allocated with the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
When the immediate crisis has passed and there are “windows of opportunities [...] the focus can begin shifting towards transition planning and realizing Canadian priorities” in foreign assistance. Therefore, a more oriented foreign aid development mission is integrated in the rebuilding process and long-term projects are sent for approval.

The ambassador coordinates with locals on the ground. He works in collaboration with numerous people and is part of the Canadian WGA. Working constantly alongside the regional Desk Officers at DFAIT in Ottawa and with START operational and logistic team on the ground and at the national level, the Ambassador also coordinates with local government officials, NGOs and all relevant local groups. As part of its Country Strategy policy paper, the Ambassador has all the relevant connections needed and information on the country needs to help START to build efficient operations strategies as well as appropriate and feasible objectives.

DND operational experts join the operational division of the START team and help set the procedures for the team of military experts and civilians and coordinate with allies at the multilateral level. Guidance also determines when and how the military will exit and how the handover to civilian personnel will proceed. CIDA’s policy branch is also involved as they have a small team to coordinate with START on policy matters. NGOs and CIDA are also involved in “training key military staff, and in response simulations.”

As a recent example of cooperation and coordination of the START with the Ministry of Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces contributed a Royal Canadian Air Force CC-177 Globemaster III strategic airlift aircraft in support of Operation Serval in Mali last February 2013. This decision was announced jointly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence. That decision was taken in cooperation with the relevant representatives of each ministry involved (including CIDA) and the final outcome was that it would be a military mission – paid by the Defence Ministry – but the coordination was made through the START team.
Ambassadors can also propose programs and projects to be funded under the Global and Stabilization Fund for the country.

If there are no crises to be addressed, START still promotes stabilization by funding programs and proposals into fragile and weak states. The procedure is almost the same but does not reach the level of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet’s Committees and the approval of projects and programs is made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A proposal for a program can be made by an ambassador, a regional desk, a foreign government, an NGO or another department and highlights a need or situation to be addressed in a fragile country. The proposal is submitted to the division within START responsible for program analysis. A first review is made at the program officers’ level in cooperation with the director and recommendations are made to a committee of Directors. Attending that committee are directors of START and Directors of the relevant geographic departments. According to the decision, a memorandum document is produced (one or two pages). Then the proposal is submitted to the Minister who decides if further actions should be taken with regards to the project.

When the Minister gives his “green light” START proceeds to a more in depth negotiation with the partners which usually ends up with a contribution agreement.

START’s main objectives and focus is to help stabilize a region or a country and are motivated mainly by the concepts of rule of law, justice reform, security sector reform and the promotion of democracy, which were also key themes of the 2011 World Bank Report on conflict and development. The Correctional Services Canada, the Canadian Border Service Agency, the Ministry of Justice and the RCMP have all been important assets for such engagements. However, all these concepts need time and long-term commitments, and START has not been planned to sponsor and monitor long-term projects. Unlike CIDA, START has stabilization objectives. Therefore, cooperation and collaboration is needed to achieve real success. In 2009, following the START review, its budget was renewed for five years. START administrators have used those five years window to accept projects for a two to three year period for example for police reform in Haiti and investments in the justice system.

Box 8: Haiti example of investments in the justice sector

START sponsored a project for the construction of a large prison near Port-au-Prince, in conformity with the International Humans Rights requirements and standards. They also funded the construction of a building for the Chief Police Inspector and a Police Command Office. Those projects were presented and approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the time, for two-to-three years duration.

(c) Funding mechanisms

As previously mentioned START is the entity responsible for the overall coordination of the WGA for missions and actions in fragile states and is funded by the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). The GPSF was allocated C$149.9 million for the 2011/2012 fiscal year, from the government’s main budget.74 The Director General of START can sign off programs of up to C$5 million dollars when programs and projects are already approved by the Minister. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs wants to approve each dollar spent and wants to know what the money is allocated for. However, one consequence of that procedure is that delays are more frequent and response less rapid.

From this budget START sponsors 3 programs (see Table 2): the Global Peace and Security Program, the Global Peace Operation Program and the Glyn Berry Program. In addition to those programs, the GPSF also funds Canadian activities in the three main priority countries - Afghanistan (C$44.6 million for 2010-2011), Sudan (C$16.9 million for 2010-2011) and Haiti (C$14.0 million for 2010-2011). Thus, an envelope of about C$13.2 million is reserved to support other fragile states apart from these three, as well as a Crisis Reserve with about C$21.9 million.75 Funds are administered by project teams within START and funding levels are determined by START Board or DFAIT’s Assistant Deputy Minister, while spending through the Crisis Reserve needs to be additionally approved by the Finance Minister.
Because START has its own funds, this helps the efficiency of the structure and disbursement of funds. This fund does not “pool” money from the Department of Foreign Affairs, National Defence and the CIDA. The GPSF comes from the Government of Canada’s main budget and is allocated by the Minister of Finance. In this way, the Government avoids tensions that may arise during the approval process of projects and program funding between the three main Ministries.

Table 2: Programme allocations of the Global Peace and Security Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Peace and Security Fund – C$178 million for 2010-2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Goals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Enhanced prospects for reconstruction and stabilization</td>
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<td>2. Improve whole-of-government coherence</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Increase Canadian Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3 Programs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Global Peace Operations Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Projects for peace operations and for building peace operations capacity;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Projects that work specifically to increase the capacity of francophone countries to participate in peace operations and improve their access information and training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Global Peace and Security Program (C$100 million for 2010-2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Security sector and rule of law institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reinforce and build capacity of NGOs, international government institutions and multilateral and regional organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• policy initiatives, mentoring and training activities that promote civilian protection, safety of aid workers, justice and SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Promote conflict resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Glyn Berry Program (C$5 million 2010-2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 3 funding Envelopes for projects related to</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Democracy (C$3 million);</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Rule of Law and Accountability (C$1 million);</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Conflict Prevention and Vulnerability (C$1million);</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Who can apply to the 3 programs?
Multilateral and regional organizations; Canadian & International NGOs; Research Institutions; Foreign Governments whose activities help to achieve Canadian Foreign policy objectives.

Crisis Reserves
Approximately C$21 million for 2010-2011 to respond to new emergencies (unused funds are to be redistributed to other GPSF sub-programs)

START operations
Approximately C$20 million for 2010-2011

Canadian’s High Fragile States Priorities
Approximately C$75.5 million for 2010-2011

Other Fragile states
C$13.2 million for 2010-2011

Source: Own table. Information are quotes from the Government of Canada’s website & numbers are from the 2011 Evaluation of the Global Peace and Security Fund, p. 18.
Before gaining financial independence, DFAIT’s crisis management group had to request funds especially through CIDA or DND to finance its proposals. In addition, the budget of START is not subject to the ODA criteria and gives them more latitude to act on many levels. Therefore, START can focus more on a broad range of activities enhancing security and stabilization –Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law– in order to minimize conflicts and instability in fragile states. While CIDA’s funding ought to be more humanitarian focused and many SSR programs could not be funded according to ODA criteria.

This type of funding helped the Canadian Government in its approach and intervention in fragile and conflicted states by providing more flexibility and faster disbursement for response. In addition, the GPSF is perceived as best practice and to be well aligned with the OECD principles that donor countries are strongly encouraged to follow when working in fragile states.76

(d) Role of development policy within Canada’s whole of government approach

Even though START, under DFAIT, also has a policy analysis team, CIDA still remains the main pillar within the Canadian government in terms of cooperation aid and humanitarian and development policies. CIDA is headed by its own Minister of State and has its own humanitarian and development missions on the field, which gives it more leverage within the Cabinet. The Agency supports the work of START and its Director of Policy is a full member of START’s Advisory Board that sets the guidelines and rules of missions into fragile and conflicted countries.

At the moment, CIDA remains responsible for the majority of Canada’s international aid assistance envelopes and its ODA distributions. Even if the ODA is spread and allocated through different Canadian ministries (for example, Finance and Public Safety have ODA budget lines for programs), CIDA is the main instrument and administers the biggest part of the ODA.

Box 9: CIDA’s being merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The Government of Canada announced in its 2013 budget (which was made public on Thursday, March 21st 2013) that CIDA would be merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Ministry will be named the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development and the current Minister of CIDA will remain.77 But this leaves many critical questions and concerns about the future of Canada’s aid policy. For instance, many people from NGOs, think tanks and government employees wonder if development spending will still be fighting poverty or will it now be promoting Canada’s commercial interests as Ottawa has recently pushed for the latter.78

Currently (Spring of 2013) the government plans to implement the merger under a Budget Implementation bill, which will require approval by both Chambers (House of Commons and the Senate of Canada).

In 2007, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs also recommended to the Government of Canada the possibility of a merger. Other scientists also commented that a merger would not be dramatic and eventually could improve Canada’s policy coherence.79 But, at the moment, more information is required to have a clear judgment and make a real assessment of the matter.
CIDA also raises money for its humanitarian missions and conducts communication campaigns in Canada. They operate in cooperation with different NGOs that have projects and programs in developing countries or in fragile States. Canada’s fundraising campaigns are made through those organizations, for instance, the government encourages its citizens to give money (mostly by internet or phone) to their identified NGOs and CIDA matches the money. In other words, if you give C$50 dollars for a program through “CARE Canada”, the government will also give C$50 dollars. Not surprisingly this kind of campaign does not come without criticism, especially from opposition parties and NGOs that are not part of the campaigns. But overall it helps CIDA to make its work known to Canadian citizens, increases its visibility and for the average Canadian, it is a favourable perception (it is seen as a concrete and positive measure and makes them feel as if they can really help).

(e) Conclusions

Canada has a good foundation and practice for its whole of government approach and receives interest by members of the international community. It took a while to make the change within the Canadian government and within the mind-set of bureaucrats and reach that level of integration.

According to government officials and Canadian academics, two main structures of the Canadian WGA are key elements that have increasingly improved the Canadian’s efficiency to respond in a faster and more coordinated way to crises in fragile states. Firstly, START integrated under the Department of Foreign Affairs as coordinator body for Canada’s WGA and secondly the funding mechanism (the GPSF) that provides more flexibility in program approvals and faster disbursement.

On a final note, Canada promotes cooperation and collaboration with other donor like-minded countries and openly expresses it on several official government websites and when speaking with representatives. Cooperation for programs into “high-risk” affiliated countries helps to secure investors and investments. Canada also favours public-private partnerships. Therefore, as long as countries can find joint projects that enhance Canada’s priorities in stabilization efforts or development aid cooperation should be encouraged and looked after. In addition, Canada, through the civilian deployment programs under START, facilitates the collaboration “with our like-minded partners on the preparation, deployment and evaluation of a civilian response to enhance cooperation and ensure efficiencies of scale.”

Canadian soldiers march off parade after a change-of-command ceremony at Camp Warehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Source: Combat photo IS2003-2508a, Department of National Defense, 2003
Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2013
Australia

Australia has had much experience in supporting fragile states and developed its own remarkable whole of government approach. Confronting fragility and conflict in the Asia-Pacific region has become a mainstream part of Australia’s foreign policy in the last two decades, with about half of its development assistance spent in fragile states. The country participated in humanitarian, stabilisation and peacebuilding missions in Cambodia, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, southern Iraq and Afghanistan; its whole of government contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands is considered international best practice; and it can boast the world’s only standing corps of police officers available for rapid deployment to fragile states and situations, the International Deployment Group.

While Australia has not adopted a government-wide strategy for fragile states or created interdepartmental bodies like the UK’s Stabilisation Unit, it has developed numerous policies and institutions dedicated to fragile states and stabilisation operations that make the country a valuable example for closer inspection.

(a) Strategies and frameworks

Australia’s engagement with weak states has been driven by the need to confront recurring instability and crises in the South Pacific since the 1990s, where Australia has been a major donor and military power. By 2002, the country had participated in regional monitoring missions in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and been a major contributor to UN-led efforts to bring peace to Timor-Leste from 1999 onward. The events of 9/11 and the Bali bombings in 2002 brought a new urgency to the question of how to effectively address the linkages between security and development, making fragile states “a core preoccupation of the country’s development agency, foreign ministry, and department of defense” in the coming years.

At the whole of government level, the importance of fragile states has been reflected in successive national security policy statements. In 2008, the inaugural National Security Statement of the Rudd administration stated that “the risk of fragile states disrupting stability and prosperity in our region is an ongoing challenge” and made numerous references to the importance of improving whole of government coordination to crisis response and policy formulation. The approach was further developed by the country’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) published by the current Gillard government in January 2013, which identifies instability in developing and fragile states as one of several key national security risks Australia is faced with. The NSS highlights the “coordinated approach involving civilian, military and law enforcement” that Australia has employed in post-conflict environments and lists some activities that have been implemented since 2008 to advance policy cohesion, i.e. the appointment of a National Security Advisor to support integrated national security policy development and crisis response. Although the strategy designates the challenge of fragile states as a core concern of Australian foreign and security policy, the NSS does not incorporate or call for a more detailed interagency framework for joint analysis, planning and policy implementation for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
There are numerous references to whole of government coordination and fragile states within the policy statements of key government agencies. The 2009 Defence White Paper of the Department of Defence (DoD) commits to the integrated approach and emphasizes close coordination with civilian agencies and non-governmental organisations in humanitarian and peace operations, which are recognized as core tasks of the Australian Defence Force. Supporting regional stability and police capacity in fragile states has also become an important task of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), whose 2010 International Engagement Strategy provides whole of government guidance for integrating the AFP’s efforts into Australia’s overseas effort.

Engagement with fragile states and related issues has also been a key feature of Australia’s development program. In 2010-2011, Australia spent more than 50% of its bilateral and regional development assistance in countries that are considered fragile. With seven of the top ten recipients of Australian aid being fragile states, two thirds of Australian aid goes to neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region; Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are the two largest recipients. Development assistance to countries in South Asia (i.e. Afghanistan), Africa and Latin America has also increased recently, although from a far lower baseline.

The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has progressively incorporated statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives into its portfolio since the late 1990s. Within the government’s current aid policy framework, An Effective Aid Policy for Australia, covering the period until 2016-17, support for effective governance, including security, justice and human rights, as well as an improved humanitarian and disaster response are defined as two of five strategic goals of the Australian aid program.

The strategy acknowledges that Australian aid serves the national interest through supporting regional stability and prosperity and prescribes a whole of government delivery of Australia’s official development assistance. In December 2011, AusAID published an elaborate 100-page Framework for working in fragile and conflict-affected states that draws on international best practice and Australia’s experience in fragile contexts.

The framework lays out principles and priority areas of Australia’s development work in fragile environments and recognizes that “aid will be more effective if it is accompanied by parallel diplomatic and security efforts.” It also mentions several ways to better integrate development efforts with other ministerial portfolios, including joint country strategies as well as joint analysis and training. While the framework provides important guidance to AusAID staff, it has not been endorsed by other agencies and does not represent whole of government policy.

Government officials interviewed for this study generally shared the view that the benefits of a formal cross-government strategy for fragile states would be rather limited, as dealing with fragility and conflict has become a mainstream part of Australia’s overseas engagement. Operational engagements in Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan have also required different approaches, making a fixed formalized framework less viable. They also point out that policy coherence at the strategic level has been helped by the socialization effects that past peace operations in the Asia-Pacific have had on a cohort of senior civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), AusAID, and DoD. Moreover, interagency cooperation is generally helped by the relatively small size of the Australian government apparatus as compared to other major donors.
Nevertheless, some officials expressed the need to further invest in joint early warning and analysis and improve pre-contingency planning. There are currently no formal processes for developing interagency conflict analyses or integrated country strategies, with Australian Heads of Missions retaining a whole of government mandate at country post level. While AusAID has a cross-government mandate to develop country strategies that combine all ODA investments from all government agencies, including AFP and Defence, this does not incorporate diplomatic and security objectives. It remains to be seen whether the demand for more common analysis and planning will result in actual institutional reforms going forward.

Box 10: Australia’s whole of government approach to law and justice assistance

Security sector reform, commonly referred to as law and justice assistance in Australian parlour, has been an important part of Australia’s engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states. In 2010-11, Australia allocated A$370 million for law and justice programs, almost 15% of its bilateral aid program. About a third of these expenditures have been spent in Solomon Islands in recent, with other major programs in Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, Vanuatu and Afghanistan. Australian law and justice assistance includes support for police, courts and corrections systems, government legal offices, specialised law enforcement agencies, national human rights institutions, and civil society organisations. In countries like Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, Australian police officers have not only provided advice and capacity building support but also carried out executive policing duties for several years.

Australia’s law and justice support is characterized by its whole of government approach to delivery involving AusAID, the AFP, the Attorney-General’s Department, and a range of Australian courts and justice agencies. Half of all resources are spent through the Australian Federal Police alone, which provides a standing capacity for policing assistance through its International Deployment Group. An independent evaluation of the country’s law and justice assistance was published by AusAID’s Office of Development Effectiveness in December 2012. The review generally commended the whole of government approach applied in the law and justice sector but also highlighted current shortcomings, including “competition over access to the ODA budget, lack of a common policy framework and an absence of joint country-planning processes,” and made several recommendations to improve interagency coordination and overall effectiveness of the portfolio.91

(b) Structures and instruments

Australia’s whole of government approach is underpinned by a system of standing interagency committees and a number of ad-hoc working groups at various levels of government. The country does not have an equivalent to the UK’s Stabilisation Unit or Canada’s START. Instead, a number of institutions like the International Deployment Group, the Australian Civilian Corps and the Australian Civil-Military Centre have been created to fill specific gaps in operational and analytical capability.

The National Security Committee of the Cabinet (NSC) is the top decision-making forum for security policy and crisis management and meets on an ad-hoc basis. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, the Treasurer, the Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretary and other ministers as needed. The NSC is supported by the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), which coordinates interdepartmental implementation on policy and operational matters and serves as a clearinghouse for Cabinet-level decisions. The Secretaries Committee includes the Secretaries of all relevant government agencies, which additionally include the AFP, Border Protection, intelligence, and is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). Among several of its subcommittees, the interagency Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) at Deputy Secretary level deals with all strategic international issues and usually meets more frequently than the NSC or SCNS.92 At the working level, much interdepartmental coordination takes place through interdepartmental committees (IDCs) that are tasked with particular topics or country issues.
Major international incidents, including disasters and conflicts, that cannot be handled by Cabinet are coordinated through an **Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF)**. The task force is usually led by a senior DFAT official and at times co-chaired by the National Security Advisor. Membership and frequency of meetings vary from case to case, while specific issues or particular countries are often dealt with at the working level by various IDCs that are coordinated by the IDETF. For example, during several major crises in 2002-2003, various IDETF met 129 times in total, with 19 meetings held on the Bali bombings, 92 meetings on Iraq, four each on the Philippines and the Middle East and ten on Timor-Leste.

Interviewees pointed out that the NSC and SCNS are the most important bodies for strategic inter-agency decision-making, with the SPCG being much more dependent on the political context for its effective functioning. Some degree of strategic coordination is also provided by the PM&C and the National Security Advisor, although this seems to be rather limited. While the interagency committee system is generally seen as working well, there are no significant administrative or financial incentives to foster policy coherence between departments.

**Figure 9: Australia’s whole of government policy and crisis response framework**

At the operational level, the design and implementation of the early phase of the **Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)** in 2003 is widely regarded as "a model for peacebuilding missions that adequately incorporate interests and capacities of development, defense, police, treasury, and foreign ministry." Growing internal violence and lawlessness had led to a request for international assistance from the government of the Solomon Islands, which prompted the creation of RAMSI in July 2003 with contributions from fifteen Pacific countries under the leadership of Australia. Australian interdepartmental planning prior to deployment was led by an IDC and supplemented by an intense six-week phase of desk exercises and contingency planning that included senior planners from DFAT, AusAID, DoD, and the AFP in a facility outside Canberra. A 2010 World Bank study remarked how “the exceptional quality of the first Australian contingent” was in great part derived from their shared experience during the six-week planning exercise, allowing the mission to be "designed and implemented by the same team, who shaped a shared vision and used their institutions to best serve it."

A key feature of RAMSI is its integrated leadership structure. The mission is headed by a senior DFAT official, the Special Coordinator, who heads a team of representatives from the police, development and military branches that comprise the executive leadership of the mission, ensuring the integration of development and security objectives. Moreover, RAMSI’s security assistance has been a police-led mission, with the military only providing logistical support and backup. With regard to the mission’s performance, independent annual performance reports have noted significant contributions in the areas of policing, law and justice reform, economic governance and good governance in recent years.
Box 11: Australia’s role in the international debate about fragile states

Australia seeks to contribute its own experience in working with fragile states in the Asia-Pacific to the international donor debate and has played an important role in advancing the international dialogue process about fragile states engagement. The country is a founding member of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding that led to the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” adopted at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Australia is currently the lead donor for piloting New Deal implementation in Timor-Leste and co-chairing, together with Afghanistan, the International Dialogue Working Group on New Deal Implementation that seeks to provide guidance for New Deal implementation. The country is also an important supporter of the International Dialogue Steering Committee and the g7+ group of fragile states. Moreover, Australia helped advance the donor debate about improving whole of government approaches to fragile states as a co-chair of the OECD DAC Fragile States Group and is at present co-chairing one of the task teams of the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) that deals with New Deal implementation and reform issues.

Furthermore, an internationally innovative instrument to support security in situations of conflict and fragility is the AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG). Founded in early 2004, the IDG provides a permanent corps of specifically trained police officers that are deployable for stabilisation and police capacity building missions abroad, constituting the world’s first and only standing police capacity for peace operations. It was created in response to the large-scale deployment of police forces under RAMSI, which required logistical, training and mission support at an unprecedented scale for up to 300 Australian police officers. As of 2012, 510 of its currently 900 members have served in missions of up to two years in Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, Afghanistan and Cambodia. Two thirds of its funding (about A$310 million in total in 2012-13) are derived from the aid budget and the unit enjoys good relationships with key government partners like AusAID and Defence. While its police capacity building efforts have experienced challenges similar to those of other donors, the IDG is regarded within and outside Canberra as a highly capable and important asset in support of Australian security assistance efforts abroad.

Civilian deployment capacity is provided by the relatively new Australian Civilian Corps (ACC) managed by AusAID. The ACC was established in late 2009 to train, equip and deploy civilian specialists for stabilization and reconstruction missions in disaster and conflict response and its register currently holds about 450 experts, with a target of 500 by 2014. After a recent change to its underlying legal framework, there have been small-scale deployments to Afghanistan, South Sudan, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Thailand since 2011. The unit is still being fully stood-up and, according to one senior AusAID official, currently working to support a 100-person deployment similar to the scale of Australia’s 2004 tsunami response effort. Government officials generally expressed their support for the ACC and praised its value as valuable operational complement to ministerial resources. A first systematic review of the Corps is planned for 2014.

Another essential element of Australia’s whole of government framework is the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC, formerly Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence), which was founded in November 2008 to inform and assist Australia’s civil-military capability development for peace and stabilisation operations. With an Executive Director seconded from the Defence Ministry and a Deputy Director provided by New Zealand, the Centre’s staff is drawn from various government agencies, including DFAT, the Attorney General’s Department, AusAID, AFP, and Australian civil society. The ACMC does not have a policy mandate but supports interagency coordination through planning and monitoring civil-military exercises, lessons learned and best practice, research and internal government assessments, as well as education and training for civil-military interaction. One of its first major outputs was a conceptual framework for whole of government cooperation in conflict-related and disaster relief operations that outlined general guiding principles and specific roles and responsibilities of various agencies for effective cooperation in complex operations.
In 2011-12, the Centre led an 18-month interagency scenario exercise that included workshops on conflict assessment, monitoring and evaluation and whole of government coordination, the results of which are currently segueing into other projects and subject areas, i.e. security sector reform, seeking to generate "evolutionary gains that assist all agencies do business better together."105 Although the ACMC is formally attached to the DoD, it works closely with all relevant agencies and provides important interagency coordination support and lessons learned advice across government.

(c) Funding mechanisms

Australia does not have a jointly administered funding mechanism or a dedicated fund for conflict prevention, crisis response and post-conflict peacebuilding. Most activities relating to fragility and conflict are financed through departmental budgets and bilateral country programs. In 2012-13, AusAID is spending over A$1.6 billion in fragile states, which includes significant investments in statebuilding and peacebuilding activities in Pacific partner countries and support to international funds like the World Bank’s State and Peace-building Fund, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and various research organisations like the International Crisis Group and the Asia Foundation.106 There is no demand within the Australian government to create jointly administered or specifically dedicated funds for conflict-related activities, and AusAID is currently able to finance most activities directed at conflict and fragility rather flexibly through its country programs.

(d) Role of development policy within Australia’s whole of government approach

Major policy documents like the NSS and the aid framework recognize development as an integral part of Australia’s whole of government approach towards fragile states. Australian aid is clearly seen as an important lever for building regional stability and contributing to the country’s national security objectives. As regards Australia’s overseas development engagement, AusAID administers 85-90% of Australian aid and has a whole of government mandate to draft country strategies that align all ODA investments from across government. Country plans and aid activities by other departments are discussed and overseen by the Development Effectiveness Steering Committee (DESC), which is a whole of government body comprised of AusAID’s Director General, the Deputy National Security Adviser and Deputy Secretaries from DFAT, PM&C, the Department of Finance and Deregulation and the Treasury. An independent review of Australia’s aid program noted in 2011 that the DESC is not living up to its potential and pointed out that Australian aid coherence would benefit from “greater involvement of whole-of-government partners in policy and priority setting, as well as program and activity delivery” by AusAID.107

With respect to AusAID’s actual influence on policymaking in the wider government system, the picture is mixed. At the working level, AusAID is usually well integrated into interagency committees on relevant issues. At the strategic level, there are 13 strategic partnership agreements with other government agencies like Defence and AFP that identify areas of shared interests and avenues for cooperation, including annual meetings of department heads to discuss joint priorities.108 AusAID’s Director General has also increasingly participated in meetings of the NSC and the Secretaries Committee on topics related to the aid program. However, AusAID is not a cabinet-level department and reports to DFAT, which means that the agency has considerably less political clout in the government wide decision-making process.
Nevertheless, an increased resource base – AuAID has actually outstripped DFAT in terms of staff and personnel following recent increases in the aid budget\textsuperscript{109} – and more senior level appointments have led to a greater credibility of the development agency within the whole of government framework.

In addition, AusAID has re-organized itself internally to streamline and improve its own capacity to deal with crisis, conflict and fragility. Back in 2005, a small Fragile States Unit was created within AusAID’s governance branch to advance the government’s understanding of and responses to fragility in the region. Although it comprised secondees from Defence and AFP, the unit did not make significant contributions to interagency coordination on fragile states policymaking given its small size and lacking mandate.\textsuperscript{110} In 2009, the unit was merged with AusAID’s Peace and Conflict Unit to become the Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Recovery Group, which was tasked with leading AusAID’s program development in situations of conflict and fragility and provide related training to AusAID and partner organisations. In early 2012, it was decided to create a new Humanitarian and Stabilisation Division to combine previously dispersed entities within the agency that were working on crisis- and conflict related issues. Within the division, there is a new Conflict and Fragility Branch with more senior leadership that supports AusAID country programming and delivery in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In contrast to the early Fragile States Unit, there are no secondees from other departments except within the expert register of the ACC.

\textbf{(e) Conclusions}

Even though Australia lacks a formal interagency strategy to deal with fragile states, the country has established several effective structures and capabilities to align and implement national efforts in fragile contexts. Australia is strongly engaged in fragile countries in the Asia-Pacific region through its aid program, and its whole of government engagement as part of RAMSI is considered best practice. Integrated approaches to fragile states and situations have been endorsed across government and interministerial coordination is facilitated by a well-functioning system of committees. Non-military operational deployment capacities are concentrated in the Australian Civilian Corps and the unique International Deployment Group for police-led assistance. Moreover, interagency coordination support and lessons learned are provided by the Australian Civil-Military Centre.

Nevertheless, some institutional issues remain. There are no formal arrangements for joint early warning and conflict analysis, and no integrated country strategies that combine diplomatic, development and security objectives. In light of the upcoming draw-down of Australia’s missions in Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, it remains to be seen to what degree current operational capabilities will be retained in the future and whether the insights gained from those engagements will result in a further institutional refinement of Australia’s whole of government approach to fragile states and situations.

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\textbf{A member of RAMSI’s Civil Military Liaison team interacting with local officials}
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© CPL Janine Fabre / Commonwealth of Australia
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Conclusions and Recommendations

Our analysis shows that the development of effective whole of government approaches towards fragile states remains work in progress. While various elements of an integrated approach can be found in all countries (see Annex for an overview), there are no ‘silver bullets’ and single best practice solutions for interagency analysis, planning and implementation of efforts in fragile states. Differences in political culture, legal framework, and financial resources also require the experience of other countries to be adapted to conditions in Germany. Nevertheless, there are certain elements in the institutionalization of the whole of government approach that are shared across case studies and can help to further improve the German approach. The following recommendations are based on these key similarities and represent the most important insights of the study.

High level leadership and interministerial buy-in are required to improve whole of government efforts towards fragile states. In practice, this can be greatly supported through an authoritative interagency board dedicated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The UK, Denmark and Canada all have created a senior interministerial steering body with sufficient coordination and decision-making power to oversee and align efforts in fragile states at a strategic level. As part of its mandate, such an institution could select high priority countries and review early warning analysis, determine funding allocations for major initiatives and crisis response, and provide guidance to interministerial task forces and working groups.

**Recommendation 1: The German government should consider the creation of an high level interministerial board to oversee and coordinate its engagement in fragile states and situations**

Standing interagency bodies like the UK’s Stabilisation Unit and the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in Canada, and to a lesser extent the Stabilisation Secretariat in Denmark, have demonstrated their added value as service provider within their respective country’s whole of government system. Such units help facilitate early warning and conflict analysis, support rapid crisis response, and serve as institutional memory to complement the work of ad-hoc task forces. While the unit’s particular mandate and design should be based on the needs of its stakeholder agencies (i.e. the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Defence and Interior), it should be staffed from the relevant government agencies as well as outside experts and report to an interministerial board to ensure its cross-government ownership.

**Recommendation 2: The German government should consider the creation of an interministerial unit tailored to provide monitoring, analysis and crisis response support to ministries**

Following the UK, Danish and Canadian experience, a dedicated fund for conflict prevention, crisis response and peacebuilding can not only provide a single resource base for conflict-related activities but also stimulate interministerial cooperation. Its mix of ODA and non-ODA funding should be based on an independent budget line and be guided by a well-defined framework that prescribes activities that are interdisciplinary in nature and produce an added value to existing country programs. Interdepartmental decision-making at all levels, as in the case of the UK Conflict Pool, might not be a viable governance model due to its high transaction costs; instead, similar to the Canadian and Danish approach, project management and implementation can be delegated to a single ministry while agenda setting and funding allocation should remain interministerial. In line with the first recommendation, a high-level interagency board should be responsible for strategy setting, spending allocation, and central oversight.

**Recommendation 3: The German government should consider the creation of a jointly administered fund for conflict prevention, crisis response and peacebuilding to support fragile states programming and encourage cross-government cooperation**
Integrated country strategies can be an important tool for fostering interministerial understanding, planning, and implementation. Several countries under consideration have arrangements for developing integrated country plans at headquarters (i.e. UK) or country level (i.e. Canada) that seek to consolidate diplomatic, development and security efforts. International experience suggests that cross-government country strategies and conflict assessments are an important complement to the creation of interdepartmental bodies and funding mechanisms in advancing a more effective whole of government approach.

**Recommendation 4: The German government should increase its efforts to develop inter-agency strategies for fragile states to coordinate diplomatic, development, and security objectives**

Finally, a collective insight gained from all case studies relates to the importance of reaching out to the public and non-governmental actors. Coordinated public relations efforts should be an integral part of both long-term strategies and crisis response efforts. Communication campaigns are crucial to manage expectations on part of the public and shore up popular support for overseas engagements. Moreover, civil society and academia present a wealth of thematic and geographic knowledge that the government should tap into when designing strategic frameworks and country plans for fragile states. While interministerial coordination is crucial, formal arrangements that guarantee the inclusion of outside expertise are an important complement to any whole of government framework.

**Recommendation 5: The German government should further improve and intensify its public relations efforts and the inclusion of outside expertise for fragile states policymaking**

There are clearly other issues relevant to the discussion of whole of government approaches to fragile states and situations. This includes, among other things, the value of promotional criteria that reward cross-departmental work for government officials, the operational implementation of the integrated approach at field level, and how to link up most effectively with local actors and international partners. In the area of policing, Australia’s International Deployment Group offers an interesting concept for the creation of a permanent police capacity for peace missions. Furthermore, there are other national experiences that can help inform the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of the German approach. Looking ahead, recent crises like the one in Mali have shown the need to leverage past lessons learned and further improve the integration of diplomatic, development and security means in a coherent and effective manner.
### List of abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Australian Civilian Corps</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Australian Civil-Military Centre</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<td>AusAID A</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BSO Board</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Board</td>
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<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
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<td>CCFAD</td>
<td>Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Canada)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canada’s International Development Agency (Canada)</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Conflict Pool</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Concerted Planning and Action (Denmark)</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency (Denmark)</td>
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<td>DESC</td>
<td>Development Effectiveness Steering Committee</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
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<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Stabilization Fund (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAI</td>
<td>Independent Commission for Aid Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDETF</td>
<td>Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDG</td>
<td>International Deployment Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement (Canada)</td>
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<td>IRST</td>
<td>International Stabilisation Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACS</td>
<td>Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Committee of the Cabinet (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC(O)</td>
<td>National Security Council (Officials) (UK)</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (UK/Australia)</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM&amp;C</td>
<td>Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCNS</td>
<td>Secretaries Committee on National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPCG</td>
<td>Strategic Policy Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Senior Responsible Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Stabilisation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>WGA</td>
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1. See, for example, OECD, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,” 2007; Interna-


3. See, for example, the contributions in the special issue on the German whole of government approach of the Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZfAS) in October 2012 or the discussions in related public hearings of the Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Networked Security since 2010.

4. The United Kingdom and Australia were analysed by Alexis Below while Canada and Denmark were reviewed by Anne-Sophie Belzile.


8. This included proposals by an interdepartmental Comprehensive Approach Working Group and single ministries-like the MOD. "The Comprehensive Approach’ Memorandum Submitted by Daniel Korksi, The European Council on Foreign Relations (CA 07)” (Defence Select Committee, House of Commons, June 19, 2009), para. 18–22.


11. Ibid., 5.

12. Ibid., 18.

13. Patrick and Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts, 25–27; Stabilisation Unit, Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified by the UK’s Stabilisation Unit, 2010, 10.


17. These include the heads of DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, FCO’s Multilateral Policy Di-
rectorate, and the MOD’s Security Policy and Operations Division. Chairmanship rotates annually between these three departments and is currently held by the FCO.


tions.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121025/text/121025w0003.htm#12102566000125.

21. NSC meetings below ministerial level, i.e. of the Permanent Undersecretaries, are referred to as NSC (Officials).


24. Final programme allocations are still subject to change. The overall Conflict Resources Settlement of £644 milli-
on also includes the UK’s annual peacekeeping budget of £374 million, with an earmark of £61 million reserved for excess costs that would be covered by Conflict Pool programme funds.


26. See also Andreas Wittkowsky, Evaluierung des Britischen Conflict Pool: Komparative Vorteile und strategische Anforde-
rungen, ZIF Paper, Oktober 2012.
27. “In many ways, the Conflict Pool is at its best when it acts as a venture capital fund for peacebuilding activities. Its strengths are its willingness to act quickly and flexibly in complex and dynamic environments and its ability to identify and nurture promising conflict prevention initiatives.” Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Conflict Pool Evaluation, 10.


30. The recent share of allocated project funds has been as follows: In 2008-09, MOD spent 41%, DFID 35% and FCO 24% of all Conflict Pool project funds. In 2010-11, FCO was allocated 60%, MOD 35%, and DFID’s share dropped to 5% of all funds. See Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Conflict Pool Evaluation, 3.


32. OECD, DAC Peer Review of Denmark, 2011, 11.


36. Denmark, Peace and Stabilisation, p. III.


38. Ibid., 1.

39. Ibid.


42. Ibid., 24.


44. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Stabilisation and Fragile States, 2.


46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Stabilisation and Fragile States, 2.


49. OECD, DAC Peer Review of Denmark, 2011, 11.


55. Patrick and Brown, Sum of Its Parts, 57.


57. Patrick & Brown, Sum of its parts, 69.


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60. Patrick & Brown, Sum of Its parts, 61.
69. Ibid.
70. OECD, Canada DAC Peer Review, 2012, 83.
71. Ibid., 15.
74. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 31.
82. Patrick and Brown, Sum of Its Parts, 78.
85. Ibid., 9-10.
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89. AusAID, An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making a Real difference—Delivering Real Results (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), 4.
92. Deputy Secretaries (“Senior Executive Service Band 3”) in the Australian public service are comparable to the position of Director General in countries like Germany.
93. APCM COE, Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas (Canberra: Australian Government / Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, 2010), 31–33.
95. Patrick and Brown, Sum of Its Parts, 90.
96. For more background information, see Elsina Wainwright, “Responding to State Failure—the Case of Australia and Solomon Islands,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 3 (2003): 485–498.
99. For the latest annual performance reports, see: http://www.ramsi.org/about/key-documents/annual-reports.html.
108. Ibid., 263–64.
110. Patrick and Brown, Sum of Its Parts, 81ff.
111. While Australia’s National Security Council of Cabinet and the associated Secretaries Committee play an important coordination role within the country’s whole of government system, their deliberations are not solely focused on fragile states and related issues.
112. See, for example, the analysis of the Dutch, Swedish and US experience by Andreas Wittkowsky and Ulrich Wittkampf, Pioneering the Comprehensive Approach: How Germany’s Partners Do It, ZIF Policy Briefing, January 2013.
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